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The experimental results of the current paper reveal positive relations between short- 
selling bidding prices and the WTA-WTP gap. This result may be explained by the 
status-quo bias.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The current paper examines short-selling biding prices and relates these prices to the 
WTA-WTP  gap  and  to  some  behavioral  effects.  Short-selling  an  asset  in  finance 
means to borrow and sell the asset in the current market price, promising to buy it 
back at a later date (hopefully at a lower market price) and return it to the lender. In 
our experiment, we give the individual the choice to sell an asset (lottery) short by 
bidding the minimum price this individual is willing to accept in order to make a 
commitment to pay the asset’s outcome (future price after realization of the lottery). 
Several  experimental  studies  have  examined  the  short-selling  position  for  lottery 
tickets.  Eisenberger  and  Weber  (1995)  used  the  Becker,  DeGroot,  and  Marschak 
(1964)  (BDM)  procedure  to  elicit  buying,  selling,  short-selling,  and  short-buying 
prices.  Their  results  indicate  that  subjects  clearly  distinguish  between  risky  and 
ambiguous lotteries and understand the different ways in which lotteries are framed.  
Several other experimental works deal with trading in group experiments and show 
the relevance of short-selling constraints (e.g., King et al., 1993; Ackert et al., 2002; 
Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Fellner and Theissen, 2006). 
 
Some other studies have suggested a relation between behavioral biases and short-
selling.  For  example,  Scheinkman  and  Xiong  (2003)  proposed  a  model  of  asset 
trading  based  on  short-selling  constraints  and  heterogeneous  beliefs  generated  by 
agent overconfidence. In the current paper, we also relate the short-selling bidding 
pattern  to  behavioral  biases,  such  as  the  status-quo  bias  (e.g.,  Samuelson  and 
Zeckhauser, 1988). In particular, we experimentally examine the relation between the 
WTA-WTP gap and subjects’ short-selling bidding pattern.  We asked subjects in 
second-price  auctions  (Vickery  1961)  to  bid  the  prices  for  buying  (WTP),  selling 
(WTA), and short-selling (WTAS) of different lottery tickets.    3 
 
The disparity between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) has 
been  demonstrated  repeatedly  in  many  experiments  (e.g.,  Kahneman  et  al.,  1990; 
Thaler  et  al.,  1992,  Horowitz  &  McConnell,  2002).  In  the  context  of  lotteries, 
Kachelmeier  and  Shehata  (1992)  confirmed  the  endowment  effect,  which  has  an 
impact on the bidding pattern of individuals. Yet, recent studies have questioned the 
existence and interpretation of the WTA-WTP gap (Shogren et al. 2001, Plott and 
Zeiler, 2005).  List (2003) found that the endowment effect can be eliminated by 
market experience. His results from field auctions for sportscards indicate that offers 
and  bids  are  significantly  different  for  naive  consumers,  but  statistically 
indistinguishable for experienced consumers.  
 
The  WTA-WTP  gap  has  been  linked  to  the  status-quo  bias  (Samuelson  and 
Zeckhauser,  1988).  Studies  have  demonstrated  that  people  are  reluctant  to  make 
changes in their current state and to trade objects they own.  Most of the experimental 
studies  that  find  WTA-WTP  gaps  provide  support  for  the  status-quo  bias,  (e.g., 
Kahneman,  et al., 1990, 1991; Thaler et  al., 1992, and Hartman,  et al., 1991).  In 
addition, status-quo effects for risky choices were found by Shogren et al. (1994). 
In the current paper we show how subjects’ short-selling (WTAS) bidding patterns are 
related to the status-quo bias. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses of the study. 
Section 3 describes the experimental procedure, and Section 4 presents the results. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.   
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2  Hypotheses 
 
The endowment effect explanation for the WTA-WTP gap emphasizes the feeling of 
ownership that subjects have when they ask a higher price for an asset they own than 
the  price  they  offer  for  buying  the  same  asset.  The  status-quo  bias  explanation 
emphasizes people’s willingness to remain in their current position when asking a 
higher price for selling an asset they own than for buying the same asset.   
According to the last explanation, the status-quo bias increases the WTA-WTP gap 
and in addition increases the short-selling bid (WTAS). Therefore, we expect to find 
a  positive  relation  between  WTAS  and  the  WTA-WTP  gap.  In  order  to  test  this 
hypothesis,  we  used  an  experimental  evolution  of  lotteries,  as  described  in  the 
following section. 
 
3  The Experimental Method 
 
The participants in the experiment were 51 undergraduate students of economics
1. 
The experiment took place in a computerized lab and lasted approximately half an 
hour.  Subjects  were  asked  to  bid  prices  for  buying,  selling  and  short-selling  of 
different lotteries in a second-price auction (SPA)
2 (see examples in Appendix A). 
Subjects  were  given  written  instructions
3  telling  them  that  in  the  case  of  a 
buying/selling auction, the subject with the highest/lowest bidding price will win the 
auction,  but  will  pay  the  second  highest/lowest  bidding  price  in  the  group 
                                                 
1 The students were from Ben-Gurion University. 
2 The Vickery Auction is used to elicit truthful revelation of values in laboratory experiments (e.g.,       
  Cousey et. al, 1987). 
3 Translated version will be provided upon request.   5 
participating in the auction.  The auctions were presented in a random order to avoid 
any order effect. 
In each auction, subjects received an initial balance and were told that at the end of 
the experiment, they would be randomly divided by a computer program into groups 
of five and would compete on buying lotteries, selling lotteries and selling obligations 
to pay lottery outcomes, using SPA. 
All subjects were told that one of the problems would be randomly selected (at the 
end of the experiment) and that they would be paid 10% (in N.I.S.) of their final 
balance in the selected problem
4. The assets are described as follows: 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
All assets were presented in three positions: buying, selling and short-selling. 
 
4  Results 
A separate regression was run for each lottery according to the following equation: 
                                 WTAS = α + β (WTA-WTP)                                     (1) 
Table 2 presents the results for equation 1 for each lottery.  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
We  found  that  β,  the  coefficient  of  (WTA-WTP)  in  the  regression  analysis,  was 
positive  and  significant  for  all  the  lotteries.  Therefore,  the  results  confirm  our 
hypothesis that for all the lotteries the WTAS of an individual is positively related to 
his or her WTA-WTP gap.  
                                                 
4 The average payment was 20 N.I.S. (approximately 4.5 US$).    6 
The WTA-WTP gap can be viewed as a measure of the status-quo bias, since an 
individual who owns an asset (long position) requires “a status- quo compensation" to 
move  to  a  lower  or  zero  position.  Similarly,  the  individual  requires  related 
compensation for moving from the zero position to a short position. This "status-quo 
compensation" has an impact on the willingness to sell short (WTAS).     
 
The fact that the constant (α) in equation (1) does not differ from 1 (except for special 
lottery E) indicates that the status-quo compensation for short-sell is added to the 
mean value of the lottery.   
 
5   Discussion 
The current paper reveals the relation between  short-selling bidding price and the 
WTA-WTP gap. The results indicate that the short-selling asking price (WTAS) is 
positively related to the WTA-WTP gap, thus confirming our hypothesis.  
 
Our behavioral analysis shows that the bidding pattern of individuals is very much 
related to their reference point.  A possible explanation for these results may be the 
status-quo bias, which is one of the common explanations for a positive WTA-WTP 
gap. Individuals with status-quo bias offer a high short-selling price (WTAS) in order 
to maintain their current position (status-quo) without the lottery obligation.  
Since individuals differ in their WTA-WTP gap, they also differ in their bids for 
short-selling.  Therefore,  in  the  markets  we  will  observe  heterogeneous  behavior, 
which includes short-selling by those individual with lower status-quo bias and of 
course with different expectation regarding the return on the asset. In addition, people 
with  a  higher  WTA-WTP  gap  will  require  higher  compensation  for  short-selling, 
which in turn, will have a negative effect on investors' liquid assets.  These results are   7 
important for better understanding the patterns of short-selling bidding prices, which 
are especially significant in financial markets. Moreover, in real markets short-selling 
is normally used by experienced traders. Hence, the findings of List (2003) that the 
endowment effect is reduced for experienced traders may lead to a conjecture that 
experienced  traders  in  a  market  that  specializes  in  short-selling  will  show  lower 
WTAS, according to equation (1). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Main Assets Description 
  Probabilities and Values   
Asset/Probabilities  30%  40%  30%  Expected 
Value 
Lottery A   100  60  20  60 
 
  Probabilities and Values   
Asset/Probabilities  40%  40%  20%  Expected 
Value 
Lottery B   150  80  20  96 
Lottery C   15  8  2  9.6 
Lottery D  160  100  -40  96 
 
  Probabilities and Values   
Asset/Probabilities  5%  75%  20%  Expected 
Value 
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Table 2: Regressions Results * 
Asset  α   β  R-Square 
Lottery A  1.06 (0.00)  0.37 (0.03)  0.09 (0.03) 
Lottery B   0.97 (0.00)  0.62 (0.00)  0.39 (0.00) 
Lottery C   0.98 (0.00)  0.25 (0.03)  0.1(0.03) 
Lottery D   0.99 (0.00)  0.30 (0.00)  0.37 (0.00) 
Lottery E  1.53 (0.00)  0.57 (0.00)  0.29 (0.00) 
* WTAS = α + β(WTA-WTP) 
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Appendix A  
•   (1) Buying a Lottery (WTP) 
Your initial balance is 100 N.I.S. 
What is the maximum price you are willing to pay for buying the following 
lottery ticket? 
 
Probability  Payoff 
30%  100 
40%  60 




(2) Short selling (WTAS) 
Your initial balance is 100 N.I.S. 
What is the minimum price you are willing to receive in order to make a commitment 
to pay the following lottery’s outcome? 
 
Probability   Payoff 
30%  100 
40%  60 
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(3) Selling a Lottery You Own. 
Your initial balance is 100 N.I.S. In addition, you own the following lottery ticket: 
 
Probability   Payoff 
30%  100 
40%  60 
30%  20 
 
What is the minimum price you are willing to receive for selling this lottery ticket? 
 